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STUDENT NOTES




At the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Devel-
opment (UNCED), 154 countries signed the Framework Convention on
Climate Change (CCC),' the first international agreement to address the
enhanced greenhouse effect.2 The Convention aims "to achieve ...
stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a
level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the
climate system."3 To illustrate the need for an international response,
participants pointed to the results of environmental risk analysis, which
indicated that greenhouse gas emissions are likely to cause world-wide
ecological damage and harms to human health, to illustrate the need for
an international response. This Note examines the role that risk analysis
played in fashioning the CCC and argues that risk analysis should play
a significant part in implementing the Convention.
Deciding what risks individuals, nations, and the world should
accept, eliminate, or reduce requires setting priorities. There are limited
resources available to address those risks. Risk analysis provides a tool
to rank risks and to choose appropriate responses to those risks.
Policymakers already use this tool at the national level, particularly in
the United States,4 and are giving increasing attention to its use in
* University of Michigan, B.B.A (1986); University of Michigan Law School, J.D.
(1993).
1. For the text of the Convention, see Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating
Committee For a Framework Convention on Climate Change, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., 2d
mtg., U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18(Part II)/Add.1 (1992) [hereinafter CCC].
2. This Note uses the terms "greenhouse effect," "global warming," and "climate
change" interchangeably. A greenhouse effect occurs naturally when certain atmospheric trace
gases absorb infrared radiation and redirect it back towards Earth, raising the Earth's surface
temperature. The enhanced greenhouse effect is caused by anthropogenic sources of the trace
gases. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), POLICYMAKERS SUMMARY
OF THE SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT OF CLIMATE CHANGE, REPORT FROM WORKING GROUP I TO
IPCC 3 (June 1990) [hereinafter IPCC SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT]. Anthropogenic greenhouse
gases include carbon dioxide, methane, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), and nitrous oxide.
3. CCC, supra note 1, art. 2.
4. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT:
MANAGING THE PROCESS (1983); SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, REDUCING RISK: SETTING
PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (1990).
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evaluating certain global risks, including those posed by climate
change.'
While the international negotiators who drafted the CCC recognized
the risks posed by climate change due to greenhouse gas emissions,
other factors tempered their resolve. First, although they realized that
global warming could present an environmental peril of staggering
proportions, participating nations avoided committing to definitive
responses because of uncertainty over the extent and nature of this peril.
Second, the power imbalance between those causing the potential hazard
and those bearing the brunt of its effects further diluted the collective
response embodied in the Convention. Finally, the economic, political,
and technical difficulties of abating emissions of greenhouse gases
reduced the scope of the international response.
For these reasons, the Convention provides merely a procedural
framework for international action, rather than specific substantive
commitments. 6 The Convention requires signatories to adopt and imple-
ment programs that limit greenhouse emissions and protect sinks - e.g.,
forests - that absorb emissions. They must also submit periodic reports
that inventory their greenhouse gas emissions and describe plans aimed
at reducing the emissions to 1990 levels by an unspecified future time.7
Despite its limited substantive scope, the Convention starts the
global community's official journey on the road to addressing the prob-
lem of climate change.' This Note examines why and how the tools of
risk assessment and risk management should act as signposts on this
journey. Part I examines some of the unique aspects of global warming
which suggest that there is a need for the systematic approach of risk
analysis processes. Part II describes the risk assessment and risk man-
agement policy tools. Finally, Part III analyzes how these tools affected
the CCC negotiations and what role they should play in post-Convention
policy.
5. See infra part III.A.I.
6. To induce the United States to sign, on May 9, 1992, diplomats agreed to a Conven-
tion that omitted specific targets and timetables for response actions. See Comment, Cold
Comfort, NEW SCIENTIST, May 16, 1992, at 3; Fred Pearce, Draft Treaty Fails to Put Limits
on Emissions, NEW SCIENTIST, May 16, 1992, at 5; William K. Stevens, With Climate Treaty
Signed, All Say They'll do Even More, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1992, at Al. For a general
discussion of the Framework Convention, see Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary, 18 YALE J. INT'L L. 451, 493-96
(1993).
7. CCC, supra note 1, arts. 4, 12. See infra note 139 and accompanying text.
8. The CCC starts the journey by providing a mechanism for "institutionalized, periodic
and informal review of [each nation's regulatory regime] with simplified amendment proce-
dures." Ginther Handl, Environmental Security and Global Change: The Challenge to
International Law, 1 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 3, 5 (1990).
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I. NATURE OF THE GLOBAL WARMING THREAT
Global warming is a type of environmental peril that international
law has only recently begun to address.9 Several characteristics distin-
guish this hazard from traditional environmental concerns. These charac-
teristics indicate complications that arise in addressing climate change
and suggest the use of risk analysis to reduce those complications.
First, global warming 'exceeds local and national boundaries.'0 The
sources of greenhouse gas emissions and the sinks which remove those
gases are located throughout the world. No part of the globe is immune
from the effects of climate change. Thus, policymakers should consider
all constituencies' concerns, abilities, and contributions to global warm-
ing in formulating international solutions to the threat.
Second, many different types of anthropogenic sources contribute to
the greenhouse effect. These sources include the burning of wood, coal,
or other fossil fuels by individuals; automobile emissions; emissions
from coal-fired power plants; the use of chemicals in industrial process-
es; agricultural activities such as cattle husbandry and rice cultivation;
and deforestation." Consequently, a wide variety of activities can be
subject to change or abatement. 2
Third, global warming presents many different hazards including
temperature fluctuations, changes in precipitation patterns, sea-level rise,
and loss of species.' 3 These hazards affect certain regions of the world
more detrimentally than others. Conversely, some evidence indicates that
some regions may benefit from global warming.'
4
. Fourth, the economic, political, scientific, and social context in
which policymakers must fashion global solutions to climate change
9. The negotiations regarding ozone depletion confronted a similar, yet less comprehen-
sive, problem. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987,
26 I.L.M. 1550 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989). See RICHARD E. BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLO-
MACY (1991); Richard E. Benedick, Building on the Vienna Convention: Lessons from 'The
Ozone Hole', in WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, GREENHOUSE WARMING: NEGOTIATING A
GLOBAL REGIME (1991).
10. See Paul R. Portney, Assessing and Managing the Risks of Climate Change, in
GREENHOUSE WARMING: ABATEMENT AND ADAPTATION 83 (Norman J. Rosenberg et al. eds.,
1989); Handl, supra note 8, at 4.
11. IPCC SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at xvi-xv.
12. Despite the variety of sources, policymakers have focused on the primary culprits
such as the large carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel consumption in the United States.
Id. at xii; see also infra notes 74, 113 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 79-86 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 103.
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may shift rapidly.' 5 Scientific findings continue to modify our under-
standing of the problem, its severity, and potential solutions. Economic,
political, and social arrangements continually fluctuate as nationalistic
disputes flare up, as countries move towards new forms of government,
and as economic alliances form. Although such fluctuation is not unique
to this type of environmental problem, the scale of global warming
makes solutions especially vulnerable to these shifting circumstances.
Finally, global climate change could lead to severe irreversible and
cumulative effects. The carbon life cycle indicates that current carbon
dioxide emissions will affect the global climate for generations to
come. 6 Greenhouse gases will accumulate in the atmosphere creating
climate change and feedback effects that could result in catastrophic
losses of biodiversity, changes in precipitation, and dismal human health
conditions.' 7 No current or anticipated technology will reverse this trend
by assisting the atmosphere's assimilative capacity. Uncertainty exacer-
bates the resulting risks: "what little is known about [the] mechanism
[of climate change] establishes that [we are gambling] with high
stakes."' 8
Given these characteristics, the solutions to the climate change
problem "must come to reflect a much greater emphasis on precaution-
ary policies and a systematic rather than segmented approach to environ-
mental resource management."' 9 Methodical attention to the risks may
provide this emphasis. The appropriate precautionary perspective on risk
can accommodate the irreversible, cumulative, and severe effects of
global warming. The remainder of this Note will discuss the manner in
which the disciplines of risk assessment and risk management can assist
in comprehending and addressing this multifaceted danger.
15. See Handl, supra note 8, at 4.
16. See, e.g., id. at 4; Talbot Page, A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar
Risks, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 207, 214 (1978).
17. See infra notes 79-86 and accompanying text; George M. Woodwell, The Effects of
Global Warming, in GLOBAL WARMING: THE GREENPEACE REPORT 116, 131 (1990) ("The
possibility exists that the warming will proceed to the point where biotic releases from the
warming will exceed in magnitude those controlled directly by human activity. If so, the
warming will be beyond control by any steps now considered reasonable.").
18. Page, supra note 16, at 209.
19. Handl, supra note 8, at 4. Risk assessment and management procedures provide the
stability to help guide policy in an environment of "controlled instability." See id. at 6-7
(quoting Joseph Sax, A General Survey of the Problem, in SCIENCE FOR BETTER ENVIRON-
MENT, PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT 753,
755-56 (1976)).
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II. THE RISK ANALYSIS POLICY TOOLS
To address the problem of climate change given the limited knowl-
edge of the different aspects of the problem, and the constraints posed
by political, economic and sociological interests, the CCC must use
effective tools to focus international efforts on the most promising
responses to global warming. Risk assessment and risk management are
two such tools. Taken together, these processes provide a method for
ranking responses to environmental problems, as well as furnishing a
systematic approach for analyzing the complex Convention issues.
Part II.A presents an overview of the risk assessment process, which
sets priorities among environmental risks (i.e., which risks are least
acceptable). It first analyzes the scope of risk assessment and the need
to broaden the process to encompass ecological risk assessment. Next,
after outlining the stages of risk assessment, it discusses two features of
the process: the uncertainties inherent in identifying and estimating
environmental risks, and the debate over whether subjective perceptions
of risk should influence risk characterization. Part II.A concludes that
uncertainty does not invalidate risk assessment and that subjective
perceptions should be considered. Part II.B discusses risk management,
the process of choosing the appropriate risk-reducing responses for the
worst risks. This Part examines two approaches to risk management:
cost/benefit analysis and the precautionary, principle.
A. Risk Assessment
Risk assessment is a method used to evaluate the probabilities and
values of the adverse impacts of environmental hazards.2" Traditional
environmental risk assessment focuses only on the specific human health
effects caused by a pollutant. A broader notion of "ecological risk
assessment" is increasingly applied to hazards facing ecosystems.2
Ecological risk assessment recognizes that anthropogenic environmental
harms affect not only human health, but also the health of entire ecosys-
tems. From a utilitarian perspective, risk assessment should embrace this
broader notion because productive and vital natural ecosystems are
20. See Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risks, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA.
L.REv. 1027, 1028 n.1 (1990) (defining risk "to mean an expected value arrived at by
multiplying the potential adverse consequences of an event - loosely, its costs - by the
probability that the event will occur (the probability might be objective or subjective).").
21. Risk assessors have .only recently given increased attention to ecological risk
assessment. See, e.g., Steve Nash, What Price. Nature? Future Ecological Risk Assessments
May Chart the Values and the Odds, 1991 BIoScIENCE 677 ("The fledgling practice of
ecological risk assessment may provide both the odds and the values for major environmental
decisions in the future.").
Fall 1993)
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intimately related to the ultimate well-being of people.22 Its use may also
be justified with either an "altruistic rationale," which maintains that
people are ethically obligated to protect nature, or a "nature centered
rationale," which declares that humans should respect nature's indepen-
dent right to exist.
23
The multifaceted effects of global warming necessitate consideration
of risks to both humans and ecosystems.24 A general framework for risk
assessment" which can apply to both ecological and human health risks
includes three stages: (1) identifying the hazard; 26 (2) estimating the
hazard's potential harm;27 and (3) characterizing the risk.28 In
22. See Lacksman D. Guruswamy, Global Warming: Integrating United States and
International Law, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 221, 247-51 (1990); Nash, supra note 21, at 677.
23. SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, supra note 4, at 9; Guruswamy, supra note 22, at
248-51.
24. GURUSWAMY, supra note 22, at 246, states that global warming effects are primarily
ecological, which understates the interconnectedness of ecological health and human health.
For a discussion of the multifaceted effects of global warming, see infra notes 79-86 and ac-
companying text.
25. Currently, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) suggests the use of two
different frameworks, one for risks to health - see NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra
note 4 - and one for ecological risks - see ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
FRAMEWORK FOR ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT (1992). Some commentators have argued for
the use of a unified framework encompassing both health and ecological risk assessment. Risk
Assessors Must Talk to Risk Managers, EPA's Barnes Says, PESTICIDE & TOXIC CHEMICAL
NEWS, Apr. 14, 1993. This Note presents a generalized framework, which is drawn from both
KRISTIN S. SHRADER-FRECHETTE, RISK AND RATIONALITY: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
FOR POPULIST REFORMS 5 (1991) and the National Research Council, and comports with
either EPA framework. Although there are nuanced differences between the EPA frameworks,
the Note's description of the risk assessment steps suffices for the topics to be discussed.
Explaining all the nuances is beyond the scope of this Note.
26. This step may also be termed problem formulation. The threats to ecosystems, or
"environmental values" ("end points" in EPA ecological risk assessment parlance) and to
health are identified. See, e.g., A Step Toward Ecological Risk Guidelines, EPA J.,
Jan./Feb./Mar. 1993, at 33 [hereinafter Ecological Risk Guidelines]. In human health risk
assessment, the hazards generally derive from exposure to pollutants. Ecological risk assess-
ment encompasses a broader concept of hazard origins termed "stressors." Id.
27. The estimation stage entails determining the probabilities and values of the adverse
health and ecosystem effects. Two steps have traditionally occurred in this stage when
evaluating human health risks: (1) dose-response assessment: determining "the relation
between the magnitude of exposure and the probability of occurrence of the health effects in
question;" and (2) exposure assessment: determining "the extent of human exposure." See
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 3. Traditionally, the dose-response and
exposure assessments will lead to determinations of mortality or morbidity rates associated
with a particular risky activity. See Gillette & Krier, supra note 20, at 1072. In ecological risk
assessment, mortality or morbidity rates do not provide appropriate measures for the adverse
effects to an ecosystem. Instead, the step "measurefs] the adverse effects associated with a
stressor." Ecological Risk Guidelines, supra note 26, at 33.
28. Risk characterization describes "the nature and often the magnitude of [the] risk,
including attendant uncertainty," NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 3, or a
determination of "likelihood of environmental harm associated with a stressor." Ecological
Risk Guidelines, supra note 26, at 33.
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considering nontraditional risks, such as harm to ecosystems, the
framework faces heightened uncertainty, particularly with respect to
identifying and estimating risk. Part II.A.1 addresses this issue.
Considering nontraditional risks also invalidates the use of only
traditional objective criteria such as mortality or morbidity rates for
characterizing the dangers. Other factors, including subjective percep-
tions of risk, must enter the equation.29 Part II.A.2 takes up this topic.
1. Uncertainty in Risk Assessment
Uncertainty is an inherent part of modem environmental risk.3" An
examination of the characteristics of environmental hazards provides an
insight into the nature of this uncertainty. Characteristics inherent in the
threat of climate change include:
* Ignorance of mechanism - The state of our knowledge of
how the global climate system works is both limited and limit-
ing. 3'
* Uncertain methods - Rather than working from direct evi-
dence, one must extrapolate the causes and effects of global
warming from computer models and from historical trends.32
* Latency - Long delays may occur before the onset of global
warming and before its resultant effects are recognized.33
* Signal-to-noise ratio - Factors other than greenhouse gas
emissions or reduction of sinks can affect the climate. Cyclical
variations and natural emissions may cloud the ability to deter-
mine the precise causal relationship of anthropogenic sources
to climate change.34
* Variability of responses - Different regions may be affected
differently by climate change.
29. Once the assessment is broadened beyond considerations of human health, the need
to consider subjective perceptions becomes stronger. See infra notes 48-52 and accompanying
text.
30. James E. Krier, Risk and Design, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 781 (1990).
31. Page, supra note 16, at 208.
32. Id. at 209. Further uncertainties may arise from factors related to the mechanics of
risk assessment. First, the data that assessors feed their models may be poor or incomplete.
Second, the variables fed to the model do not remain constant. Third, the actual models used
to measure risk are crude. See Peter H. Stone, Forecast Cloudy: The Limits of Global
Warming Models, TECH. REv., Feb.-Mar. 1992, at 32.
33. See Page, supra note 16, at 213 (describing "the extended delay between the initia-
tion of a hazard, or exposure to it, and the manifestation of its effect."); Portney, supra note
10, at 84; Christopher D. Stone, Beyond Rio: 'Insuring' Against Global Warming, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 445, 450 (1992).
34. Page, supra note 16, at 84.
Fall 1993]
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Comparative risk assessment does not, however, lose its value
because of these uncertainties. In allocating resources or determining
whether a threshold of risk has been exceeded and requires a response,
some magnitude of uncertainty is acceptable.35 Moreover, the prospect
of facing a "false negative" mandates action despite incomplete informa-
tion.36 A false negative occurs when a harmful activity is deemed safe.
A decision that continued significant emissions of greenhouse gases and
the destruction of sinks are safe, if they actually are not, would produce
a potentially disastrous false negative: global warming, if it occurs,
would likely be irreversible and catastrophic.37
2. Objective Versus Subjective Characterization of Risk
Controversy exists over whether objective factors alone should be
considered in characterizing risks. According to the traditional view
(usually held by "expert" risk assessors), risk assessment (both human
health and ecological) is a scientific undertaking aimed at quantifying
the probability and costs of adverse effects to derive an "expected loss"
from different environmental dangers. 3 8 The adverse effects are mea-
sured in objective dollar terms such as lost agricultural productivity,
damage from rsing sea level and more severe storms, and, most promi-
nently, mortality and morbidity rates indicating adverse health effects.39
The risks are then ranked according to expected loss and are fed into the
risk management process.
Critics of this approach note that subjective perceptions of risk held
by lay people should influence the ranking of risks.4 For example, they
argue that whereas an assessor using objective factors to rank risk would
treat one death as equivalent to another death, others may not view
deaths in such a linear fashion. Members of the public tend to view risk
in a subjective multi-dimensional manner by considering several factors.
These considerations include the equity of risk distribution, the
35. See infra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
36. Krier, supra note 30, at 783-84; Guruswamy, supra note 22, at 236-37.
37. See Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of
Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562, 614 (1992); supra notes 16-18 and
accompanying text.
38. Hornstein, supra note 37, at 571; William K. Stevens, What Really Threatens the
Environment?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1991, at C4. This stance is reflected in the statement of
former U.S. EPA Director, William Reilly, that "[s]ound science is our most reliable com-
pass." Id.
39. See, e.g., Gillette & Krier, supra note 20, at 1072; Hornstein, supra note 37, at
591-92.
40. See, e.g., SHRADER-FRECHETTE, supra note 25, at 183 n.90; Hornstein, supra note
37, at 610-16.
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concentration in time and space of potential consequences, the level of
consent to being exposed to the hazard, fear of catastrophe and
irreversible consequences, and unfamiliarity with the posed risk.4'
Including subjective public perceptions of risk in the risk assessment
process helps legitimize the public's exposure to continuing risks by
more closely reflecting the view of those subjected to those risks and by
providing a sense of procedural justice.42 Some commentators have
questioned whether risk analysis can "adequately subsume or encompass
all our values, across the board., 43 This question is particularly relevant
in an international context in which countries and cultures observe
vastly different values. Subjective perceptions, however, do have an
important place in the assessment process, particularly when considering
global warming, which the public perceives with a heightened sense of
dread."4
Assessors utilizing the traditional risk analysis model argue that such
subjective measures should be conceptually separated from risk assess-
ment.45 They contend that public concerns are accounted for in risk
management, while risk assessment should concentrate on providing
"objective" or "scientific" conclusions about expected loss. 46 Neverthe-
less, commentators 47 and this Note deem, for reasons outlined below,
that the public's subjective perceptions should be formally recognized at
this stage rather than only at the risk management stage.
Incorporating subjective perceptions into risk assessment is justified
by the difficulties encountered in determining objective values for the
effects of climate change.48 No marketplace exists for. determining the
41. See, e.g., Gillette & Krier, supra note 20, at 1073 (citing W. LOWRANCE, OF Ac-
CEPTABLE RISK: SCIENCE AND THE DETERMINATION OF SAFETY 86-94 (1976)). For an
evaluation of the origins and rationality of these subjective views, see id. at 1076-79.
42. See infra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
43. Douglas MacLean, Introduction to VALUES AT RISK 3 (Douglas MacLean ed., 1986).
44. Guruswamy, supra note 22, at 246.
45. Hornstein, supra note 37, at 607.
46. See, e.g., id. at 594 n.149, 607; Christopher J. Daggett et al., Advancing Environ-
mental Protection Through Risk Assessment, 14 COLUM. L. REV. 315, 318 (1989).
47. See, e.g., SHRADER-FRECHETTE, supra note 25, at 5. Shrader-Frechette replaces the
characterization step with what she terms "risk evaluation," which entails determining the
relative acceptability of risks in terms of costs and subjective perceptions. Id. at 5, 188-90.
Risk management only entails determining how to address a risk rather than whether a risk
should be addressed. Id. at 5.
48. If one justifies the consideration of risks to ecosystems based on "altruistic" or
"nature centered" rationales, see supra note 23 and accompanying text, then one would argue
that subjective factors naturally play an important role. How else but subjectively can one
measure mankind's ethical obligation to protect nature or nature's independent right to exist?
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value of the environmental risks; they are externalities.49 Assessors,
therefore, must often use their own subjective estimates to quantify the
risk."0 As some commentators have noted:
It is doubtful whether even the most well-intentioned expert can
perform the required tasks with anything close to the comprehen-
sive rationality implicit in the method.... [H]uman problem
solving suffers from limited computational capacity, incomplete
searches for alternatives, limited information, and uncertainty about
consequences, yet failure in any of these respects can have a pro-
found effect on ultimate judgments about risk.5'
This critique applies to scientific assessors seeking objectivity when
assessing global warming: "[r]eputable assessors affirm that many of the
most serious environmental risks, such as global warming from burning
of fossil fuels, are 'highly resistant to quantification.' 02 Because risk
assessors must already apply their own subjective intuitions to rank
risks, incorporating the subjective values of a broader audience would
not undermine the assessment process.53
Consequently, by inserting subjective perceptions into the risk
assessment tool, the result of the process is no longer a transitive list of
risks that may be compared according to a single attribute, cost. Rather,
the result will be either an ordinal ranking of most acceptable to least
acceptable risks or a general description of the complexities of the risks
to assist the policymaker who, in comparing risks, would otherwise rely
49. Economists, however, may use a method called "contingent valuation," in which they
survey members of the public to determine how much they would be willing to pay for a
particular natural resource. See Nash, supra note 21, at 679.
50. Indeed, subjective judgments necessarily enter each risk-assessing task- in identify-
ing, estimating, as well as characterizing risks. Judgments are inevitable in, for example,
preparing the scope of inquiries, managing investigations, construing findings, and determin-
ing the weight of those findings. See Gillette & Krier, supra note 20, at 1062. In dealing with
uncertainties risk assessors apply heuristics (rules of thumb) to make their determinations.
These heuristics are themselves subjective judgments that inject bias into the process. See id.
at 1091-96.
51. Id. at 1064.
52. SHRADER-FRECHETTE, supra note 25, at 96 (quoting P. Gleick & J. Holdren, Assess-
ing Environmental Risks, 71 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1046 (1981)).
53. Moreover, injecting subjective views of a broader audience into the process combats
another problem; by obtaining an "objective" ranking of risks from the risk assessment
process, policymakers in the risk management process are able to discredit as irrational
divergent public perceptions of risk based on subjective perceptions. Gillette & Krier, supra
note 20, at 1075 (noting that risk "experts" dismiss the public's perception of risk as insane
and irrational). The risk experts are in essence able to stack the deck against those who, for
qualitative reasons, disagree with how the risks have been ranked. This Note maintains that
the objective assessment pundits should not get to stack the deck.
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on intuition. 4 Indeed, a general description may be the only defensible
result from the process because certain values affecting the subjective
perceptions of risk are incommensurable."
Despite the problems with risk assessment, the value of this tool as
an useful starting point should not be discounted. Objective cost rank-
ings should still be used to inform the CCC policymaker's perceptions
of risks.5 6 Because of the concerns encountered in applying only objec-
tive factors, however, the subjective measures of different negotiating
constituencies should play an important role in the assessment process
by providing general risk descriptions in addition to the objective rank-
ings.
B. Risk Management57
In risk management, policymakers take the results of the risk assess-
ment process and determine which risks should be addressed and how
they should be addressed.5 8 The following examines two approaches
used in making risk management decisions: risk-cost/benefit analysis
and the precautionary principle. Conventional risk management involves
conducting the risk-cost/benefit analysis with the goal of minimizing the
sum of the costs of the risk and the costs of avoiding the risk. The costs
of avoiding the risk include the actual costs of abatement (the control
costs) and the foregone benefits provided by the abated activity produc-
ing the risk.59
To provide reliable risk management decisions, the risk costs and
avoidance costs should be ascertainable and certain. These criteria are
met by placing confidence in the assimilative capacity concept. This
concept assumes "that science can accurately determine the assimilative
capacity of the environment and that, once determined, sufficient time
54. See Hornstein, supra note 37, at 594.
55. See id. at 601-603.
56. Id. at 615.
57. A full analysis of the use of risk management would entail examining all of the
potential solutions considered to combat the risks of climate change. Such an examination is
beyond the scope of this Note. Instead, this Note discusses the general contours of risk
management and how the procedure interacts with the results of risk assessment.
58. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 3 ("Risk management is the process
of weighing policy alternatives and selecting the most appropriate regulatory action, integrat-
ing the results of risk assessment with engineering data and with social, economic, and
political concerns to reach a decision."); see also SHRADER-FRECHETTE, supra note 25, at 5;
Daggett et al., supra note 46, at 318; Gillette & Krier, supra note 20, at 1063; Hornstein,
supra note 37, at 570.
59. The benefit may itself be the reduction of other risks. See generally Peter Huber,
Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1985).
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for preventative action will remain."'" The concept stresses "the ability
of science to accurately predict threats to the environment and the
measures needed to prevent such threats."'6' Thus, those who believe in
the concept insist that, given enough time, risk assessors can accurately
predict the relative risks of different activities and can then quantify and
compare the risk and abatement costs.
Conducting risk-cost/benefit analyses based on the assimilative
capacity concept, however, becomes problematic as the valuations
become more uncertain, the likelihood of having sufficient time for
preventative action diminishes, and the cost of a judgment error be-
comes prohibitive. As an alternative to balancing costs and benefits
precisely, risk managers could establish a threshold risk level, which, if
surpassed, would call for measures to combat the risk. Thus, if a risk is
deemed "unacceptable" for any number of quantitative or qualitative
reasons, the policymakers would implement measures to reduce the risk.
In this sense, policymakers can account for both transitively ranked risks
derived from objectively-based risk assessment and ordinally ranked
risks or general risk descriptions that take account of subjective percep-
tions of risk.62
This second approach corresponds to the "precautionary principle":
nations are obligated to take preventative measures to avoid harm to
other states.63 Some international law has recognized that a "reasonably
foreseeable" harm or a "significant risk" of harm triggers the precaution-
ary principle. For example, the Ozone Convention employs the precau-
tionary principle in the face of the threat of irreversible damage from
ozone-destroying chemicals, despite a lack of complete scientific certain-
ty.6' Other adaptations of this principle go as far as reversing the burden
of proof; certain activities must be proven safe before policymakers will
approve them.65
The precautionary principle rejects the assimilative capacity tenets.66
This normative principle may mandate preventative action before
60. See Ellen Hey, The Precautionary Concept in Environmental Policy and Law:
Institutionalizing Caution, 4 GEO. INT'L ENVTL L. REV. 303, 305 (1992).
61. Id. at 308.
62. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text. Policymakers would still utilize risk-
cost/benefit analyses to determine the most efficient response.
63. PATRICIA W. BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVI-
RONMENT 95 (1992).
64. Id. at 97-98.
65. Id. at 98.
66. Hey, supra note 60, at 305 (The precautionary concept "rejects a policy whereby
activities or substances are regulated or banned only if they have been scientifically proven to
be harmful to the environment.") (footnote omitted).
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scientific proof of harm is determined. It emphasizes "the limitations of
science to accurately predict threats to the environment., 67 Under this
guise, risk assessment should not be seen as a method that gives disposi-
tive answers that can be used in a cost/benefit analysis. Rather, it is a
tool to determine whether a certain threshold risk has been reached, and
to rank relative priorities for taking action.
The CCC has, to some extent, embraced the precautionary princi-
ple.68 The participants, although lacking scientific certainty, have recog-
nized that climate change poses some risk to the world, and thus re-
quires preventative actions. They can now use the risk analysis tools to
assist in further understanding the extent and distribution of the risks
involved and the responses required to prevent unacceptable risks.
III. RISK ANALYSIS IN THE CLIMATE CHANGE CONVENTION
Risk analysis should play three roles in guiding climate change
policy. First, it should help policymakers weigh the magnitude of the
risk of global warming relative to other environmental hazards. 69 Sec-
ond, given the unacceptability of the risk of climate change, risk assess-
ment should assist in determining which causes of climate change to
address in order to decrease the overall threat of global warming. Final-
ly, once policymakers set the priorities, risk analysis should assist in
ascertaining the most effective means to reduce unacceptable risks,
given the resources available for the task. 0
Ideally, climate change risk assessments would accurately describe
the likelihood and magnitude of potential harms from activities leading
to global warming. Given the costs of abatement or adaptation, decision
makers would then choose how to respond to the potential harms. Such
an ideal may be unattainable because of the uncertainties in the
quantifications necessary to determine likely harms. Thus, parties to the
CCC may have to rely primarily on qualitative estimates of the risks and
use the precautionary principle to guide their responses.
67. Id.
68. CCC, supra note 1, art. 3(3).
69. One commentator questions whether global warming received too much attention at
UNCED at the expense of other environmental concerns. Gregg Easterbrook, Green Cassan-
dras, THE NEw REPUBLIC, July 6, 1992, at 23. Easterbrook notes that the threat is secondary
to those posed by confirmed problems including species extinction as well as unsafe drinking
water and poor sanitation in the Third World. "When it came time for Northern governments
to offer the South new funds for addressing the low-profile issues that really matter, the rich
countries ... said, 'Sorry, we've made this huge commitment to greenhouse controls, no
money left over.' " Id. at 24.
70. This Note will only discuss the first two goals as the third, evaluating different
responses, is beyond its scope.
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Part III.A examines how the CCC negotiators actually used risk
assessment and management tools during the negotiations and finds that
the uncertain quantifications involved in the assessments profoundly
influenced the final agreement. Part III.B discusses considerations that
should go into ongoing risk assessment and risk management. It deter-
mines that both the quantitative (objective) and the qualitative (subjec-
tive) aspects of risk assessment can assist in future actions under the
CCC.
A. The Influence of Risk Analysis on the Climate Change Convention
The process of assessing the risk of the greenhouse effect primarily
occurred prior to and separate from the CCC negotiations. The risk
characterizations derived from this process were subsequently used in
the negotiations that took on the form, if not the label, of risk manage-
ment. Part III.A. 1 examines the risks that were identified, estimated, and
characterized before the negotiations and explores how the uncertainties
involved in the assessments led to the different negotiating positions that
affected the final policy decisions. Part III.A.2 describes the CCC provi-
sions regarding the role of further scientific research, which should
include risk analysis, in reducing uncertainty.
1. Negotiating and Drafting the CCC
In 1988, the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution
43/53, formally recognizing climate change as a common concern of
humanity.7' Later that year, the United Nations Environment Program
(UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) established
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to assess the
potential impact and severity of global climate change and to provide
possible policy responses. 72 This Section first summarizes the IPCC's
assessments of the likelihood of an increase in global temperature, the
probable effects of this increase, the distribution of those effects, and the
uncertainties in the assessments. The Section will then discuss how
71. Recognition that the issue required international action arose from a series of
conferences during the 1980s such as the Toronto Conference on the Changing Atmosphere in
June, 1988. The 48 participating countries at this conference called for a comprehensive
global convention and a 20% reduction from 1988 levels of greenhouse gases by 2005. David
A. Wirth & Daniel A. Lashof, Beyond Vienna and Montreal: Multilateral Agreements on
Greenhouse Gases, in WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, GREENHOUSE WARMING: NEGOTIATING
A GLOBAL REGIME, 13, 16-17 (1990).
72. Michael Grubb, The Climate Change Convention: An Assessment, 15 INT'L ENVTL.
REP. (BNA) 540 (Aug. 12, 1992); Matthew Paterson & Michael Grubb, The International
Politics of Climate Change, 68 INT'L AFF. 293, 294 (1992).
[Vol. 15:215
Risk Analysis in the Climate Change Convention
those uncertainties affected the negotiations by using risk-cost/benefit
analysis to examine why certain countries took particular negotiating
stances in the face of such uncertainties. The Section concludes that
these uncertainties, and the fact that certain countries disregarded the
precautionary principle in favor of a strict risk-cost/benefit approach, led
to a less forceful Convention.
In June 1990, the IPCC issued a report outlining its scientific assess-
ment of climate change.73 The report first identified the threat of an
enhanced greenhouse effect from the increasing atmospheric concentra-
tion of greenhouse gases, with carbon dioxide identified as the primary
contributor to that threat.74 The report offered estimates of the likely
increase in average global temperature under several emission scenarios.
In their "business-as-usual" scenario - which assumes a doubling of
carbon dioxide by the year 2025 and a second doubling by the year
2050 - the IPCC predicted temperature increases of .3 degrees celsius
per decade during the next century.75 The IPCC predicted the tempera-
ture increase would lead to an average sea level rise of six centimeters
per decade during the same time period.76
The IPCC noted that their findings were based on best estimates.
Because of uncertainties,77 the IPCC could not rule out that predicted
climate changes could result from natural climate variability, nor that an
even larger enhanced greenhouse effect could be masked by variability.
The report stated: "[t]he unequivocal detection of the enhanced green-
house effect from observations is not likely for a decade or more. 78
73. IPCC SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT, supra note 2.
74. Id. at 1. The IPCC also reported the likely increase in water vapor resulting from
global warming that would further enhance the effect.
75. Id. The estimation had an uncertainty range of .2 to .5 degrees celsius per decade.
76. Id. The estimation had an uncertainty range of three to ten centimeters per decade.
77. The report noted that:
There are many uncertainties in our predictions particularly with regard to the
timing, magnitude and regional patterns of climate change, due to our incomplete
understanding of:
* sources and sinks of greenhouse gases, which affect predictions of future
concentrations
* clouds, which strongly influence the magnitude of climate change
* oceans, which influence the timing and patterns of climate change
* polar ice sheets which affect predictions of sea level rise.
These processes are already partially understood, and we are confident that the
uncertainties can be reduced by further research. However, the complexity of the
system means that we cannot rule out surprises.
Id. at 2.
78. Id. at 2.
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In a second report,7 9 the IPCC identified and estimated the potential
adverse effects resulting from an increase in global temperature. 0 First,
the IPCC predicted that climate change will affect agriculture and live-
stock, yet the Panel was uncertain as to whether this would result in a
net increase or decrease in agricultural productivity. The report did note,
however, that certain regions would experience severe effects.8' Second,
climate change could produce a decrease in biological diversity. De-
pending on the rate of climate changes, some species would be unable
to adapt to different ecological conditions.8 2 Third, due to changes in
precipitation, water scarcity will likely afflict certain areas.83 Fourth,
communities vulnerable to natural hazards will face increased risks of
flooding, severe drought, landslides, and storms. 84 Fifth, health effects
such. as increased susceptibility to eye and skin damage could increase. 5
Sixth, famine could result from disruptions in natural food chains,
especially those which are marine related. Finally, sea level rise could
produce major socioeconomic consequences such as displacement of the
millions of people living in coastal areas.8 6
The report provided a number of references to the distribution of
risks resulting from climate change. First, certain regions would bear the
brunt of decreased agricultural output, notably those regions in the
southern hemisphere that are least able to adjust to climate change.
Second, risks to natural terrestrial resources would fall most heavily on
the communities whose adaptability options are limited (for example,
island and coastal communities) and where environmental stresses
already affect the community.8 7 Third, arid and semi-arid regions would
face greater risks from decreased water resources. 8 Fourth, the areas
most vulnerable to the increased severity of natural disasters are primari-
ly located in developing countries.
79. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, POLICYMAKERS SUMMARY OF
THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE, REPORT FROM WORKING GROUP II TO IPCC
(June 1990) [hereinafter IPCC POTENTIAL IMPACTS].
80. The Working Group based its predictions on the following assumptions: a doubling
of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere by 2025 and a second doubling by 2050, an increase of
global mean temperature of 1.5 to 4.5 degrees celsius, an unequal distribution of the tempera-
ture increase, and a sea level rise of .3 to .5 meters by 2050 and one meter by 2100. Id. at 1.
81. Id. at 2.
82. Id. at 3.
83. Id. at 4.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 5.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 3.
88. Id. at 4.
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This report noted that its findings were subject to considerable
uncertainties as well. The uncertainties were most noticeable in the
Working Group's inability to derive comprehensive estimates of the
effects of global warming at regional levels 89 and in its inability to
predict the timing and rates of change due to lags between cause and
effect.90 Due in part to these uncertainties and valuation difficulties,9' the
report outlined the risks in relatively general terms. It lacked cost esti-
mates for the adverse effects, leaving valuation issues to the negotiators.
Nevertheless, the IPCC reports guided the negotiators who fashioned the
CCC.
92
In December, 1990, the U.N. General Assembly established the
Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention
on Climate Change (INC). 93 In February, 1991, the INC began negotia-
tions.94 The initial negotiations were aimed at establishing a "framework
convention" that outlined the general principles and obligations of the
89. Id. at 1.
90. The Working Group indicated that lags exist between:
i) emissions of greenhouse gases and doubling of concentrations;
ii) doubling of greenhouse gas concentrations and changes in climate;
iii) changes in climate and resultant physical and biological effects; and
iv) changes in physical and ecological effects and resultant socioeconomic (in-
cluding ecological) consequences. The shorter the lags, the less the ability to
cope and the greater the socioeconomic impacts.
Id. at 2. The Working Group further noted that "[t]he changes will not be steady and surprises
cannot be ruled out." Id.
91. Moreover, commentators have argued that in projecting effects 100 years hence, the
IPCC was taking a misleadingly short-term perspective; because the greenhouse effect will
cause climate change well into the 24th century, an assessment of the costs (and benefits) of
global warming should take into account the long term. See, e.g., WILLIAM R. CLINE, THE
ECONOMICS OF GLOBAL WARMING (1992). On the other hand, the 100-year assessments of the
IPCC find that a longer-term outlook entails even greater uncertainties. See Hot Stuff, THE
ECONOMIST, July 11, 1992, at 67.
92. The CCC participants also utilized other information regarding the risk of climate
change. See, e.g., Ministerial Declaration of the Second World Climate Conference, U.N.
GAOR, 45th Sess., Agenda Item 81, addendum pt.l, U.N. Doc. A/45/696/Add.l (1990). In
addition, the IPCC released a third report regarding response strategies, see INTERGOVERN-
MENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, POLICYMAKERS SUMMARY OF THE FORMULATION OF
RESPONSE STRATEGIES, REPORT PREPARED FOR IPCC BY WORKING GROUP 1II (1990), and
updated its findings before the final two negotiating sessions, see INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 1992 IPCC SUPPLEMENT (1992).
93. G.A. Res. 45/211, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 49A, at 146, U.N. Doc.
A/45/49 (1990).
94. The negotiations were set to run parallel to the work of the UNCED Preparatory
Committee in order to ready a convention for signing at the Earth Summit. DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC INFORMATION, INFORMATION PROGRAMME FOR UNCED, FRAMEWORK CONVENTION
ON CLIMATE CHANGE; BACKGROUND, U.N. DPPI/1229 (1992) [hereinafter CONVENTION
BACKGROUND]. For a detailed examination of the negotiations, see Bodansky, supra note 6, at
474-92.
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participants.95 Subsequent negotiations to incorporate protocols into the
framework convention would determine the specific targets (levels of
emission) and timetables (dates for stabilizing emissions) for responses.
From the outset, the uncertainties associated with the risks of cli-
mate change significantly affected the negotiations. As an initial step,
virtually all parties agreed that a primary goal of the negotiations was to
formulate commitments and mechanisms that would assist in improving
the understanding of climate change risks.96 They also recognized that
uncertainty should not impede progress towards the implementation of a
convention that would address the problem as soon as possible.97 Never-
theless, the uncertainties did influence how much countries were willing
to do to alleviate the risks.
Different reactions to the uncertain prognosis for climate change led
to varied positions regarding commitments. One divergence in positions,
culminating in the primary dispute of the negotiations, involved whether
to include specific commitments to reduce emissions in the Convention
itself rather than waiting for subsequent protocols. Certain participants
expressed the view that all greenhouse gas emissions, or at the very
least carbon dioxide emissions, should be stabilized to 1990 levels by
the year 2000.98 As the negotiations developed, the United States be-
came a vociferous opponent of this position, and promoted the original
goal of a framework first, protocols later format.99 The United States
favored voluntary compliance with emissions reduction goals rather than
explicit obligations, basing its position on the proposition that scientific
evidence on climate change was insufficient to warrant the economic
disruption that could result from aggressive action to reduce emissions
to specific target levels by predetermined times."m
95. CONVENTION BACKGROUND, supra note 94.
96. Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee For a Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change on the Work of its First Session, A/AC.237/6, 8 March 1991, at 4,
13, 14 [hereinafter First Session Report]. Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating
Committee For a Framework Convention on Climate Change on the Work of its Second
Session, A/AC.237/9, 19 Aug. 1991, at 16 [hereinafter Second Session Report].
97. First Session Report, supra note 96, at 6, 13.
98. Id. at 13; Second Session Report, supra note 96, at 13; CONVENTION BACKGROUND,
supra note 94.
99. The Hot Air Summit, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 7, 1991, at 15; Money, U.S. Position
Remain Barriers for Accord on Climate Change Issues, 14 INT'L ENVTL. REP. (BNA) 502
(Sept. 25, 1991); William K. Stevens, As Nations Meet on Global Warming, U.S. Stands
Alone, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1991, at B5.-
100. See, e.g., William K. Stevens, Earth Summit Finds the Years of Optimism Are a
Fading Memory, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1992, at C4. For comments regarding the controversy
over the uncertainties inherent in climate change predictions, see Wallace S. Broecker, Global
Warming on Trial, NAT. HIST., Apr. 1992, at 6. For views that the problem is overstated, see
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A closer examination of the dynamics of risk analysis provides
insight into why nations responded to the uncertainties differently. Risk
assessment provides an estimation of the costs of a risk. In the context
of global: warming, it determines the cost of accepting a certain level of
greenhouse emissions and sink reduction that leads to some estimated
level of climate change and its resulting adverse effects.' 0 ' The estimated
cost is the probability of the adverse effect multiplied by the estimated
value of the adverse effect. Due to the uncertainty of the probabilities,'0 2
and to the difficulties in valuation, an observer could expect widely
divergent cost estimates from the same information base. 1
03
Next, risk management determines the appropriate response to the
assessed risks." A decisionmaker may work from two approaches to
risk management: risk-cost/benefit analysis-or the precautionary princi-
ple. The following focuses on an application of risk-cost/benefit analy-
sis; the precautionary principle is examined at the end of the Section.
Risk-cost/benefit analysis compares the costs of accepting certain
risks with the costs of avoiding those risks, including the actual costs of
abatement and the foregone benefits that would have resulted from the
abated activity."° Two factors affecting this equation may have tem-
pered the negotiators' impulse to urgently seek abatement responses.
First; the alternative response of adaptation, rather than abatement, may
have led to an underestimation of the risk costs. Second, the more
certain immediate costs of abatement outweighed the uncertain costs of
the risks.
Discounting the cost of climate change risks may result from ac-
counting for the 'costs and benefits of adaptation,0 6 rather than
Estimate of Global Warming May Be Exaggerated, IPCC Says, 15 INT'L ENVTL. REP. (BNA)
35 (Jan. 29, 1992); Warren T. Brookes, The Global Warming Panic, FORBES, Dec. 20, 1990,
at 96; Richard S. Lindzen, Letter, New Greenhouse Report, 249 Sci. 1093 (1990).
101. See supra part II.A.
102. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
103. Any estimate of the costs of climate change is further complicated by evidence that
global warming may have both positive and negative effects. See Stone, supra note 33, at 451
(quoting William K. Stevens, Carbon Dioxide Rise May Alter Plant Life, Researchers Say,
N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 18, 1990, at B5) ("A warmer, moister, carbon-rich atmosphere, combined
with longer (frost-free) growing seasons, 'portends major improvements in agricultural
productivity, promises a lusher and more robust world, and suggests that burgeoning trees and
other vegetation might remove enough carbon dioxide from the air to stabilize atmospheric
concentrations, although at higher levels than now.' ").
104. See supra part I.B.
105. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
106. For example, building sea walls to counter rising sea levels or moving agricultural
activities to more amenable areas.
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abatement, responses. 7 Risk managers could compare the cost of the
risk with alternative abatement or adaptation measures and choose the
most efficient response. The CCC negotiators, however, focused on
asking which abatement measures should be taken. They gave adaptation
solutions secondary consideration, if any at all. Instead, the negotiators
probably only viewed adaptation measures as decreasing the potential
risk of climate change; to the extent that parties could adapt to climate
change, the risk cost would be reduced. Similarly, some negotiators may
have implicitly decided to treat the risks as less ominous by assuming
that future technologies or activities would assist in decreasing the
risks. 8 Reliance on the hope that yet undiscovered technologies will be
developed to decrease the need for abatement exacerbates the uncertain-




A second factor affecting the balancing of risk and abatement costs
arose from the unequal levels of certainty of the different types of costs.
The participants in the negotiations understood both the 'economic and
the political costs of curtailing activities leading to greenhouse gas
emissions. Constituencies such as the energy industry, for instance,
ensured that the negotiators were well aware of the costs of aggressively
reducing carbon dioxide emissions. Thus, when evaluating whether to
proceed with immediate or near-term abatement responses, negotiators
compared the uncertain future cost of the risk with the more certain,
daunting, and near-term cost of abating the risk. To counter this imbal-
ance, commentators and negotiators argued that many immediate re-
sponses, such as improving energy efficiency, would cost little and
might even provide net benefits."
The resulting level of risk and response costs recognized by the
participants affected their individual negotiating positions. The U.S.'s
107. Christopher Stone addressed the costs in a slightly different manner, stating that the
costs borne by "victims" to avoid climate change losses (adaptation) contribute to the
uncertainty associated with abatement costs. Stone, supra note 33, at 452. Others argue that
adaptation costs are an alternative to abatement costs. See, e.g., Portney, supra note 10. This
Note will regard the net benefit or cost of adaptation as affecting the estimated costs of the
risk (of not abating).
108. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 33, at 448 (noting that skeptics of the risk of climate
change assume that "our descendants will almost surely have a capacity to adapt and respond
with technical countermeasures that could not have been imagined by our ancestors.").
109. For a critical view of the pitfalls of "technological optimism," see James E. Krier &
Clayton P. Gillette, The. Un-Easy Case for Technological Optimism, 84 MICH. L. REv. 405
(1985).
110. See, e.g., Greenhouse Policy: A Bargain?, 252 Sci. 204 (1991); Root of Evil at Rio,
THE ECONOMIST, June 13, 1992, at 12; Edward S. Rubin et al., Realistic Mitigation Options
for Global Warming, 257 Sci. 148 (1992). Nevertheless, policymakers will likely run out of
easy, cost-effective responses before the climate change risks are alleviated acceptably.
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position reflected a country perceiving low national risks relative to
immense national abatement costs. The national income of the United
States, by one estimate, was expected to decrease by only .25 percent
from a doubling of carbon dioxide."' On the other hand, the cost of
restricting carbon dioxide emissions to 1,990 levels and thereafter reduc-
ing them to eighty percent of 1990 levels by the year 2020 had been
estimated at over $3.5 trillion."12 Thus, the United States, -as the leading
source of atmospheric carbon dioxide," 3 had the most to lose from
aggressive abatement, but not necessarily as much to gain." 4
Other developed countries - for example, Canada, Scandinavian
countries, European Community (EC) members, and Japan - were in a
different position. Although these participants may have faced risks
similar to those confronting the United States, these parties did not face
such extraordinary abatement costs because of their current energy
efficiencies." 5 Additionally; to some extent, these countries brought to
the negotiations a "perception of international and environmental respon-
sibility and sympathy with developing countries."'1
6
A different position is reflected in the attitudes of small island states
and other less adaptable countries. These countries face higher expected
costs from the risk than other participants," 7 but they do not face the
high costs of abatement because they are not a main source of green-
house gas emissions." 8
11. William D. Nordhaus, To Slow or Not to Slow: The Economics of the Greenhouse
Effect, 101 ECON. J. 920, 932-33 (1991). A decrease in national income reflects the expected
economic loss from climate change .effects to the United States.
112. Alan S. Manne & Richard G. Richels, CO2 Emission Limits: An Economic Costs
Analysis for the USA, 2 ENERGY J. 51 (1990).
113. The United States is the world's largest coal producer, the second largest oil
producer, and the second largest gas producer. Paterson & Grubb, supra note 72, at 302.
114. Stone, supra note 33, at 453; Paterson and Grubb, supra note 72, at 296. Compare
this situation to that found in the ozone depletion negotiations where the United States had
less to lose from abatement activities relative to other, negotiators and thus supported an
aggressive agreement. The European countries, however, faced larger losses and thus opposed
strong restrictions. See generally Benedick, supra note 9.
115. Paterson & Grubb, supra note 72, at 300-303. Japan recognized advantages of
energy efficiency but were less committed to specific targets; they argued for making "best
efforts" to stabilize emissions. Id. at 303. The states of Eastern Europe and the Common-
wealth of Independent States played a smaller role in negotiations due to more pressing
domestic concerns. Id. at 304.
116. Id. at 301.
117. These states, organized into the Alliance of Small Island States, are "extremely
vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, particularly sea-level rise, some having their very
existence as states threatened." Id. at 299.
118. Certain developing countries may face a different form of abatement cost, however.
To limit their future emissions, these countries could be asked to curtail certain types of basic
economic development required to bring these countries out of impoverished conditions. The
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A fourth position is reflected by those countries facing not only high
risks from global warming, but also high costs from aggressive abate-
ment. Oil producing states typify this position."9 Countries such as
Saudi Arabia are more prone to the effects of further desertification, as
well as to the dangers to already meager water supplies. Yet, reducing
consumption of fossil fuels, such as oil, will have a direct detrimental
effect on those countries' economies.' 2
Countries such as the United States - as well as oil producing
states - that would face large costs from current and near-term abate-
ment actions required further certainty in the climate change prognosis
to accept the large knowable response costs.12' Other countries such as
Canada and the EC nations were more willing to accept the uncertainties
attached to the estimated costs of the risk because their costs of abate-
ment were relatively less. Still other participants, facing higher probable
risks, were motivated towards more specific action despite the uncertain-
ty of the risk assessments. Thus, small island states advanced the most
aggressive responses to the problem. 122 These countries were further able
to advance such agendas because they did not face the higher response
costs. 123
The forgoing analysis concentrated on the risk-cost/benefit analysis
approach to risk management which would call for curtailing a risk if
the costs of the risk outweighed the costs of avoiding the risk. Due to
uncertainty over the costs, however, different negotiators called for
divergent responses. An alternative approach, the precautionary
CCC and UNCED addressed this concern under the rubric of sustainable development:
"development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs." WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOP-
MENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE 43 (1987); see also BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 63, at 3-6. In
the CCC, developed countries are committed to assisting the Third World with "cleaner"
development to avoid the risk associated with past industrial practices. CCC, supra note 1,
art. 3, I 4-5.
119. Major deforestation countries such as Brazil and Malaysia also fit into this category.
120. Paul Lewis, Battle in Rio: The Day After, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1992, at Al, A8;
The Hot Air Summit, supra note 99, at 15. Most of the developing countries formed a final,
more loosely organized group. Although often facing high risks from climate change effects,
they emphasized equity and development concerns. The largest risk these countries face stem
from poverty, thus they contended that their commitments should depend on financial and
technological transfers from the industrialized North. Paterson & Grubb, supra note 72, at
300.
121. Id. at 299, 302-303.
122. Id. at 299.
123. Extreme costs imposed on the major carbon dioxide emitters, such as the United
States, however, would have international effects because of the interdependence of the
world's economies. See Stone, supra note 33, at 545.
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principle, 24 would mandate preventative responses if risk assessment
indicates that a certain threshold level of risk has been reached. Because
the negotiators would only need to determine whether a threshold of risk
had been reached, rather than precisely balancing the costs, uncertainty
presents less of a problem under this approach. Whether a threshold has
been reached is based on the results of the risk assessment process based
either on objective factors or subjective perceptions. 125 For example,
action may be mandated because of a certain likelihood that the world
will face high costs from sea level rise (an objectively based threshold)
or because particular risks fall inequitably upon a certain region contrib-
uting little to the problem (a subjectively based threshold). Although
embracing the precautionary principle in the Convention, 26 the negotia-
tors do not appear to have used it in determining the urgency and nature
of the necessary response to identified risks.
For example, one might question whether the precautionary principle
justifies the negotiating position pushed by the United States. Indeed,
the United States may have ignored the precautionary principle altogeth-
er. In conducting a costlbenefit analysis, the United States may have
balanced the uncertain costs of the risks against the apparently large
abatement costs and determined that the balance prevented endorsing
specific actions. Alternatively, perhaps the United States did not ignore
this principle, but did not perceive that a threshold level of risk had
been reached, justifying action under the precautionary principle. What-
ever ultimately motivated the United States, its position held sway over
the final language of the Convention, which contains no specific timeta-
bles or targets, but instead merely general commitments.'27
2. The Convention
The CCC seeks to "achieve ... stabilization of greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system."' 128 More specifical-
ly, the Convention commits developed countries to reduce emissions of
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases to 1990 levels, although it
124. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
125. See supra part III.A.2.
126. CCC, supra note 1, art. 3(3).
127. In a reversal from the previous U.S stance, President Clinton's recently announced
Climate Change Action Plan seeks to reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by
the year 2000. Clinton Asks Help on Pollution Goal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1993, at A20;
William K. Stevens, U.S. Prepares to Unveil Blueprint for Reducing Heat-Trapping Gases,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1993, at C4.
128. CCC, supra note 1, art. 2.
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does not specify any date for achieving this reduction.129 Accordingly, a
primary goal for further risk assessment is to determine the relative risks
associated with different target dates for returning to 1990 emissions
levels.
In addition to the commitment to return to 1990 emissions levels,
the CCC incorporates the concept of "common but differentiated respon-
sibilities and respective capabilities"'30 to underscore the added obliga-
tion of the developed countries to "take the lead in combating climate
change and the adverse effects thereof."''
The CCC recognizes the different circumstances of developing
countries. 32 To provide for their general needs, the CCC emphasizes the
promotion of sustainable. development. 33 In addition, the Convention
mandates full consideration be given to those developing countries with
"specific needs and concerns . . . arising from the adverse effects of
climate change [e.g., small island states] and/or the impact of the imple-
mentation of response measures [e.g., oil-producing states].' 34 Devel-
oped countries should consider actions such as special funding, insur-
ance, and technology transfer for these countries.
Three specific commitments relate to how the Convention's partici-
pants are to proceed in further analyzing the risks associated with cli-
mate change. Article 4(1)(g) provides that all parties to the Convention
shall:
Promote and cooperate in scientific, technological, technical, socio-
economic and other research, systematic observation and develop-
ment of data archives related to the climate system and intended to
further the understanding and to reduce or eliminate the remaining
uncertainties regarding the causes, effects, magnitude and timing of
climate change and the economic and social consequences of
various response strategies.
Thus, signatories are committed to alleviating the uncertainties that
prevented the Convention from incorporating more specific targets and
timetables. To ensure that further analysis occurs multilaterally, article
4(1)(h) provides that the parties shall:
Promote and cooperate in the full, open and prompt exchange of
relevant scientific, technological, technical, socio-economic and
129. Id. art. 4, 1 2(b).
130. Id. art. 3, 1.
131. Id.
132. Id. art. 3, 2.
133. Id. art. 3, 4; see also supra note 118.
134. CCC, supra note 1, art. 4, 8.
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legal information related to the climate system and climate change,
and to the economic and social consequences of various response
strategies.
The CCC also includes a separate article relating directly to the conduct
of "Research and Systematic Observation" to occur pursuant to article
4(1)(g):
In carrying out their commitments under Article 4, paragraph l(g),
the Parties shall:
(a) Support and further develop, as appropriate, international and
intergovernmental programmes and networks or organizations
aimed at defining, conducting, assessing and financing re-
search, data collection and systematic observation, taking into
account the need to minimize duplication of effort;
(b) Support international and intergovernmental efforts to strength-
en systematic observation and national scientific and technical
research capacities and capabilities, particularly in developing
countries, and to promote access to, and the exchange of, data
and analyses thereof obtained from areas beyond national
jurisdiction.
3
The Framework Convention signed at Rio puts the burden primarily
on developed countries, but buys time for further analysis before they
must take more aggressive abatement measures. Critics of this response
propose that immediate action is necessary because by the time uncer-
tainties are settled, irreversible harm may already have occurred.
3 6
Some evidence exists that counters this fear. For example, two IPCC
scientists stated that a delay of ten to twenty years in further constrain-
ing emissions beyond the business-as-usual scenario would result in only
a small "penalty."'137 Whether or not a time cushion exists, risk analysis
can play a prominent role in post-Convention policymaking.
B. Post Convention Risk Analysis
The solution envisioned by the CCC focuses on developed countries
adopting national policies to limit anthropogenic emissions of
135. Id. art. 5.
136. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
137. Michael E. Schlesinger & Xingjian Jiang, Letter Revised Projection of Future
Greenhouse Warming, 350 NATURE 219 (1991), quoted in Stone, supra note 33, at 453; cf
Easterbrook, supra note 69, at 24 (A prominent atmospheric researcher, Roger Revelle, stated
that "[t]he scientific base for greenhouse warming is too uncertain to justify drastic action at
this :ime. There is little risk in delaying policy responses.").
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greenhouse gases and to protect and enhance greenhouse gas sinks and
reservoirs.138 Each country periodically is obligated to report an
inventory of their "emissions by sources and removals by sinks of
greenhouse gases," the "steps taken or envisaged by the Party to
implement the Convention," and "material relevant for calculations of
global emission trends."'' 39 Accordingly, while guided by the objectives
of the CCC, each Party will implement policy largely on a national
level. A broadly inclusive risk assessment process, however, should
guide the national risk management decisions.
At the international level, article 9 of the CCC creates a
multidisciplinary body - the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Tech-
nological Advice - from which all Parties may obtain scientific and
technical advice. 14° The Body shall regularly provide reports to the
Conference of the Parties - the "supreme body" of the Convention'
4'
- including "assessments of the state of scientific knowledge relating to
climate change and its effects."' 42 Although the Body is to draw "upon
existing competent international bodies" in garnering its information,
143
broad membership in the Body itself should be encouraged. This Body
should be the focal point for analyzing the risks of climate change.
Individual countries would benefit from conducting their own risk
assessment and management analyses in addition to maintaining involve-
ment in the Body for Scientific and Technological Advice.'" Familiarity
with and "ownership" of risk assessment and risk management tools will
enable countries to contribute to international 'appraisals of the risks of
climate change, and evaluate, from their, own unique perspectives, those
analyses conducted on an international level.
138. CCC, supra note 1, art. 4, 2(a).
139. Id. art. 12, 1. The initial communications are to occur six months after a Party
ratifies the Convention. Id. art. 12, 5.
140. Id. art. 9, 1.
141. Id. art. 7, 2.
142. Id. art. 9, 1 2(a).
143. Id. art. 9, 2.
144. See A.A. Moghissi, Poverty is the Ultimate Pollution, 12 ENVTL. INT'L 595 (1986).
Moghissi writes that:
By virtue of its scientific nature, risk assessment can be used by the developing
countries as effectively as it is increasingly used by developed nations. Risk
assessment methods developed in one country are usually applicable to other
countries and the results of risk assessments conducted in a developed country are
applicable to developing countries with necessary modifications. However, these
modifications have little to do with the degree of development.
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Striving for inclusiveness, both within the international Body itself
and through national input, presents the problem of differentiated abili-
ties to conduct risk analysis. Although risk analysis is widely used in
developed countries such as the United States, developing countries are
only beginning to make use of this policy tool. 4 ' These countries face
large economic, technical, administrative, educational, and political
barriers in applying risk assessment and management techniques.46 The
CCC addresses one of the largest barriers: the lack of trained personnel
and accumulated data. Article 5(c) provides that parties shall "[t]ake into
account the particular concerns and needs of developing countries and
cooperate in improving their endogenous capacities and capabilities to
participate in the efforts" to decrease the uncertainties and improve
understanding of risks of climate change and the costs of response
strategies. 147 Moreover, in creating the Subsidiary Body for Scientific
and Technological Advice, the CCC declares that the Body shall
"[p]rovide advice on scientific programmes [and] international coopera-
tion in research and development related to climate change" to develop-
ing countries. I'
Having examined the CCC provisions relating to further risk assess-
ment and those providing for inclusiveness in the process, this section
next explores why and how risk analysis should play a continuing and
significant role in making the CCC an effective solution to the danger of
climate change. Part III.B.1 examines why the CCC's ongoing risk
analysis process should include many interested nations and groups. Part
Ill.B.2 explores how broadly inclusive the process should be. After
evaluating the justifications for and the extent of inclusiveness in the
risk analysis process, Part III.B then turns to a more focused exami-
nation .of the risk assessment process' value in resolving the climate
change problem: Part III.B.3 discusses the role of continuing risk assess-
ment pursuant to the CCC and Part III.B.4 considers two approaches to
risk assessment that may be used for estimating climate change risks.
1. Justifications for Inclusiveness
Three primary reasons necessitate inclusion of all participants to the
Convention in the risk assessment process: assisting the decision
145. The United Nations has promoted risk assessment and management in developing
countries. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS, CONFERENCE FOR TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, THE
PROMOTION OF RISK MANAGEMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, U.N. Doc TDIBIC.31218
(1987); Kirk R. Smith, The Risk Transition, 2 INT'L ENVTL. AFF. 227, 250 n.56 (1990).
146. Smith, supra note 145, at 227.
147. CCC, supra note 1, art. 5.
148. Id. art. 9, 1 2(d).
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process, promoting cooperation, and lending legitimacy to resulting risk
management decisions. First, inclusiveness will lead to better informa-
tion on which to base decisions. Countries are generally in the best
position to determine their own national risk priorities given their sover-
eign interests and superior knowledge of effects within their borders. 49
A country's own expertise regarding its national situation can feed into
an international risk assessment mechanism.
A second justification for inclusiveness is that broad participation
promotes cooperation in decreasing the risks from climate change. If
countries are left to their own devices in determining risks, each coun-
try's scientists and economists will likely challenge the assumptions and
estimates made by those of other countries. Consequently, unilateral
analysis may lead to dissension among the parties. For example, during
evaluations of the problem of acid rain, the United States released a
unilateral assessment that suggested the problem was neither serious nor
worsening. 50 Canada severely criticized this report.' In contrast, an
earlier bilateral assessment - in the form of a joint report issued by
Canadian and U.S. scientific organizations 52 - produced agreement
over the extent of the problem and enhanced cooperation between the
two parties in seeking a solution. 5 '
Finally, inclusiveness will lend legitimacy to the risk assessments and
the resulting risk management decisions. 54 Widespread participation in
risk assessment and management reduces the sense of isolation and
helplessness that may arise from involuntary exposure to the dangers of
climate change. 55 Moreover, parties may be more likely to undertake
difficult actions that result from decisions that they perceive as legitmate.
The need for inclusiveness to promote legitimacy becomes more
149. Developing countries may not have the ability or resources to conduct the identifi-
cation or estimation stages of risk assessment but are in the best position to subjectively
characterize the risks based on their own cultural risk perceptions.
150. National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program, Interim Assessment on the Causes
and Effects of Acid Rain, Executive Summary (U.S. Govt. Printing Office 1987).
151. Canadian Federal/Provincial Research and Monitoring Coordinating Committee For
the National Acid Rain Research Program, Environment Canada, A Critique of the U.S.
National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program's Interim Assessment Report, reprinted in 1
INT'L ENVTL. AFF. 57 (1989) [hereinafter Acid Critique].
152. Joint Report to Bilateral Advisory and Consultative Group (BACG), Status of
Canadian/U.S. Research in Acidic Deposition (Feb. 25, 1987).
153. See Ross Glasgow, Canadian Policy Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
POLLUTION 310 (Daniel B. Magraw ed., 1991).
154. See Gillette & Krier, supra note 20, at 1027-28 ("The idea behind participation...
is not necessarily to improve technical accuracy of risk decisions, but rather to enhance the
legitimacy of the decision making process.").
155. Id.
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pronounced as countries' perceptions of risk become more varied.
Developed and developing countries perceive risk from vastly different
vantage points. 156 Countries face two general types of risk, often referred
to as traditional and modem (or technological). The type of risk faced
by a. country correlates closely with its level of economic develop-
ment. I57 Traditional risks associated with poverty - such as the risk of
infectious diseases resulting from poor water, air, and food quality
generally decrease during economic development. 58 Conversely, as
economies develop through modernization of agriculture and industrial-
ization, modern technology-based risks increase.
59
Three different general perspectives are discernable from this de-
scription. At one extreme, the least developed countries primarily face
traditional risks. At the other extreme, the most-developed countries
primarily face modem risks. In developed countries, traditional risks
have been controlled and are of less concern. From this perspective, risk
analysis focuses on quantifying and managing modern risks.' 6° A third
perspective is that of countries in a state of transition between the two
types of risk. Because few developing countries are isolated from eco-
nomic development pressures and the resultant influx of modem tech-
nologies and risks, most are in this risk transition category. 16' These
countries simultaneously face both traditional and modem risks, al-
though the traditional risks are generally decreasing as the modem risks
increase. Countries in this situation should perceive net risk in a differ-
ent manner than developed countries. For example, technologies deemed
too risky by developed countries because they unacceptably increase risk
may be, justified by a developing country because the technology's
traditional risk lowering properties lead to a net'decrease in that coun-
try's overall risk. 62
Accordingly, in the context of global warming, developing countries,
in their risk analysis, may ask: "Are the potential negative impacts of
global warming of sufficient magnitude to warrant placing greenhouse
156. See Frances Cairncross, Whose World Is It, Anyway?, THE ECONOMIST, May 30,
1992, at 5; Kirk R. Smith, Risk Transition and Global Warming, 116 J. ENERGY ENGINEER-
ING 178, 179 (1990).
157. Smith, supra note 156, at 179.
158. Id.
159. Modern risks may include those resulting from exposure to hazardous chemicals,
the risk to the ozone layer from the use of-CFCs, and the risk of climate change from
emissions of greenhouse gases associated with industrial processes and transportation.
160. Smith, supra note 156, at 182.
161. See generally id.
162. Id.
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gas constraints on development plans?" 63 Or: "Does the risk of global
warming warrant aggressive abatement responses by developed countries
that could result in international economic disruptions affecting a Third
World country's development prospects?" These are questions that
developing countries would likely bring to international risk assessment
and management fora.
The risk posed by natural disasters further indicates how developing
and developed countries may evaluate global warming risks from differ-
ent perspectives. Developing countries experience different impacts from
these disasters, partly due to their lower levels of economic develop-
ment. 6" As development increases, the risk posed by natural disasters -
a traditional risk - decreases. Assessors predict the enhanced green-
house effect will lead to more frequent and severe natural disasters such
as floods, droughts, and tropical cyclones." 65 Thus, global warming
increases the risks posed by natural disasters, and less developed coun-
tries will face greater harm from these risks. In this context,
policymakers in developing countries simultaneously face two risks:
traditional risks inherent in a low level of development and the in-
creased risk from global warming. In response, the policymakers could
attack the risks in two ways. They could concentrate on economic
development to decrease the traditional risk posed by natural disasters,
or they could expend efforts to ensure that natural disasters do not
worsen as a result of climate change.'66
Another example indicates that developing countries may be loath to
reduce development in order to counteract global warming. Decreases in
agricultural and forestry productivity are two primary dangers of global
warming to which developing countries are exposed; much of the under-
developed world depends on agriculture for a large portion of its Gross
Domestic Product.1 67 The trend in developing countries, however, is to
163. Id. at 185.
164. Cross-sectional evidence, for example, shows that natural disasters of the same size
have vastly different consequences in different parts of the world, depending on the level of
development; a tropical cyclone the size that may kill ten people in Florida might kill 10,000
people in Bangladesh. A similar ratio will be seen in the number left homeless. Only in the
dollar amount of property damage do disasters appear larger in developed regions. Smith,
supra note 156, at 185; see also IPCC POTENTIAL IMPACTS, supra note 79.
165. IPCC POTENTIAL IMPACTS, supra note 79.
166. See Smith, supra note 156, at 186.
167. Thomas C. Schelling, Some Economics of Global Warming, 82 AM. ECON. REv. 1,
7 (1992) ("The livelihoods earned in agriculture and other climate-sensitive outdoor activities
.. comprise 30 percent and more of all livelihoods in most of the developing world.").
Developed countries, in contrast, would feel only a minor impact from agricultural effects; for
example, in the United States, agriculture and forestry accounts for only three percent of the
Gross Domestic Product. Id. at 6.
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be less dependent on agriculture. One may therefore ask "whether
developing countries should make sacrifices in their development to
minimize the emission of gases that may change climate to their disad-
vantage. Their best defense against climate change may be their own
continued development.
168
These examples raise important issues such as the need to promote
sustainable development.169 However, their main impact in the context of
this Note is to illustrate that developing and developed countries are
differently situated. The input of both is thus necessary in CCC risk
analysis to promote the legitimacy that a democratic and cooperative
process should embody.
2. Extent of Inclusiveness
For the above reasons - aiding the decision process, promoting
cooperation, and lending legitimacy to risk management decisions -
any party that may be affected by climate change should have a voice in
the process of assessing risks. Logistics, of course, prevent individual
representation (or public participation) in the process. In response, Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs), 7 ° as representative bodies, should
have input into the process.
Inclusion of NGOs as a proxy to public participation provides two
advantages. First, NGOs may reflect public perceptions of risk, provid-
ing the information benefits and enhanced legitimacy discussed above.
Furthermore, by including NGOs (and allowing access by the media),
the "power of knowledge and public opinion"'' is brought to bear on
the nations fashioning responses to the assessed risks. "A well-informed
public [is a] prerequisite to mobilizing the political will of governments
and to weakening industry's resolve to defend" their climate changing
activities.172 Through inclusion in the process, NGOs are able to keep
their constituencies informed and ready for political action. 1
73
168. Id. at 6.
169. Whether third-world countries choose to continue development irrespective of the
risks imposed or choose to be more alarmed by the risks inherent in climate change is closely
related to the policy of developed countries holding the purse strings of economic develop-
ment and currently emitting the bulk of greenhouse gases. Yet developing countries carry a
large stick: they can continue to develop in their own manner, leading to large increases in
greenhouse gas emissions. Alternatively, developed countries can assist developing countries
with sustainable development. See supra note 118.
170. See BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 63, at 76-78. NGOs are essentially special interest
groups.
171. Benedick, supra note 9, at 5.
172. Id.
173. Willingness to exert political influence is not only affected by knowledge; to extend
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Certain NGOs also represent the otherwise unrepresentable: nonhu-
man species and future human generations. Environmental organizations
counter nations' anthropocentric cultural tendencies to discount the
interests of nonhuman forms of life. 174 Although governments are inter-
ested in protecting ecosystems because humans depend on other crea-
tures, environmental NGOs also recognize the intrinsic value of nonhu-
man lives and nature qua nature. These NGOs can best communicate the
need to consider risks to these interests.
Moral responsibility and equity require not only the consideration of
risks that are spatially distant (e.g., facing other countries), but also
those that are temporally distant. The nature of the climate change
problem means that the benefits some receive in the present entail costs
to future generations. The CCC recognizes that all parties must protect
the climate system for the benefit of both present and future genera-
tions. 175 This recognition must be buttressed by explicitly taking future
generations into account in the risk assessment process and including
appropriate NGOs to act as proxies for these concerns.
Participants promoting the interests of future generations may argue
for consideration of a longer time-frame in determining an acceptable
level of risk. Commentators have criticized assessments conducted by
the LPCC and other prognosticators as using too short a time-frame.
176
Instead of projections into the next century, the relevant time period
should extend even further into the future since greenhouse gas emis-
sions and resulting climate problems have a cumulative effect 77 (unless
emissions are reduced to a level at which the atmosphere can hold a
constant net amount of greenhouse gases). That assessors have remained
short-sighted is due in part to the increasing uncertainty as the time
period is expanded and in part to the process of discounting future costs.
The shorter-term position buoyed by these factors should face the scruti-
ny of participants taking a longer-term perspective.
The expansive inclusiveness herein proposed would have the addi-
tional benefit of promoting consideration of various theories of justice
and equity in the risk assessment debate. Risk analysis has traditionally
followed the Western economic principle of utilitarianism. By seeking to
efforts, the risk must also be salient. Generally, public pressure to take action to alleviate an
environmental problem is prompted by a crisis that brings the problem to the attention of the
public. See JAMES KRIER & EDMUND URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY 263-77 (1977).
174. See, e.g., RODERICK F. NASH, THE RIGHTS OF NATURE (1989); CHRISTOPHER D.
STONE, EARTH AND OTHER ETHICS (1987).
175. CCC, supra note I, art. 3, I.
176. See supra note 91.
177. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
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maximize expected utility, policymakers adhering to this principle find
acceptable the situation in which some countries impose substantial risks
on others provided that the average risk experienced by all individuals is
minimized.7 7 This approach has not only been criticized by western
philosophers, 79 but is probably a concept foreign to many cultures. An
example of an alternative equity and justice paradigm is Rawlsian
justice as fairness. 8 ° This paradigm treats all, including those temporally
or spatially distant, such that climate change risks are distributed to
disadvantage least those who are already least well off.' 18 The Rawlsian
approach is only one example, albeit a "Western" one, of other views of
justice and equity that may be brought to bear on assessors' attitudes
toward their task.
The implementation of the Convention must not only allow inclu-
siveness, but should also facilitate it. Absent some mechanism to im-
prove the reflection, of different attitudes in risk decisions, the most
powerful and well-financed parties will be able to exert their influence
over the risk assessment process, if not directly, then by providing
information to the assessors. The risk assessment process is highly
information dependent; an objective, independent risk assessment body
must receive data to perform its duties. Parties to the Convention plus
"existing competent international bodies" will provide the data8 2 that
they have received from their constituencies and members. Those most
responsible for producing the risks - particularly industries in devel-
oped countries - have advantages in controlling the necessary informa-
tion provided to the parties and the international bodies. A group of risk
producers can effectively organize to provide self-serving information
for, various reasons: relatively few members make up the group; the
178. See SHRADER-FRECHETTE, supra note 25, at 100-104.
179. See, e.g., id. at 100-30.
180. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY.OF JUSTICE (1971).
181. This is also known as the "maximin" approach. To arrive at a just or fair risk
assessment one can imagine the risk assessors, as rational individuals concerned with their
own interests, assessing risks behind a "veil of ignorance" - that is, without knowledge of
their own social, cultural, economic, or generational positions. In this decision situation,
applying Rawlsian claims would lead to an assessment that allows the worst-off people to
avoid the most serious disadvantage. Id. at 75-78 Because the assessors, under a veil of
ignorance, do not know in which position the "arbitrariness of the natural lottery" would
leave them, they are apt to choose an agreement in which the risk is distributed in a manner
where the least well off are least disadvantaged. Id. at 98. Other commentators have discussed
the use of this maximin approach in assessing risks. See, e.g., SHRADER-FRECHETTE, supra
note 25, at 116-29; Kenneth J. Arrow, Alternative Approaches to the Theory of Choice in
Risk-Taking Situations, in 3 COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROW: INDIVIDUAL CHOICE
UNDER CERTAINTY AND UNCERTAINTY 5, 32-34 (1984); Gillette & Krier, supra note 20, at
1084.
182. See CCC, supra note 1, art. 9, 1-2.
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members can easily identify each other and are likely already organized
through trade associations; the members have immediate, concentrated,
and large stakes in the assessments; and the members have better re-
sources including financial and informational advantages. 83 The utility,
energy, and automotive industries fit this characterization; left un-
checked, they could significantly affect risk assessments through the
information they provide.
84
The parties' most affected by the risks, as represented by NGOs, will
have organizational problems converse to those encountered by industri-
al risk producers: widely dispersed, unidentifiable, largely unorganized,
and underfinanced members with dispersed, distant, and relatively small
stakes in the assessments. 85 In addition, noticeable barriers - including
lack of scientific knowledge, lack of funding to gain scientific knowl-
edge, and modest negotiating power 186 _ Will impede the ability to have
full participation by developing countries. Because risk assessments
dominated by developed countries and their industrial interest groups
will not earn the' support of developing countries or the world's general
public, these barriers must be reduced. To some extent, the CCC has
addressed these needs.
8 7
3. The Role of Improved Risk Assessments
As they resolve uncertainties, the Convention participants may
utilize risk assessment to provide information to assist countries to
comply with the CCC, to aid the Commission in determining whether
certain countries' national policies adequately confront the ascertained
risks, and to enable the international Body to determine if amendments
or protocols are required.
183. Gillette & Krier, supra note 20, at 1068.
184. Industrial interest' groups also exert political influence in the process. Indeed, the
CCC seemed more affected by such influence than by the biased information interest groups
provided. Nevertheless, the risk assessment stage is more apt to be subversively affected by
information provision than political influence, whereas the risk management process is more
affected by politics. But see Acid Critique, supra note 151 (criticizing the U.S. scientific
assessment of the acid rain problem as being politically motivated).
185. Lack of democratic institutions further silences the voice of the people of many
nations. Barbara Crossette, What Some Preach in Rio Is Not What They Practice at Home,
N.Y. TiMEs, June 15, 1992, at A8 ("There continues to be a significant gap between priorities
perceived by [grass roots] environmental and social-action groups and the ecological priorities
of governments and global organizations[.]" To alleviate the problem, "the world has to get
down to building 'intermediate organizations' to serve as links to local environmental
groups."). NGOs may be able to assist in making these otherwise silenced voices heard, but a
change to more democratic practices is required for effective public input on this issue.
186. The developing countries do achieve some negotiating power from threats to
continue unsustainable development that can lead to greenhouse gas emissions surpassing
developed countries' current levels.
187. See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
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More exact risk assessments, may assist countries such as the United
States, which may be beholden to industrial interests, to convince con-
stituencies that action is required. Other transnational and international
pollution problems indicate how advocates of abatement actions were
blocked by powerful interests, and how increased certainty of adverse
effects reduced these impediments.
For example, during the 1980s, the Reagan administration relied on
assertions of uncertainty to block action to confront the problem of acid
rain.188 The administration's justification, however, was only one aspect
of policymaking that prevented initiative. Congress was unable to pursue
solutions aggressively due to the opposition of powerful members of
Congress representing states that would face disproportionate burdens
from abatement measures. 89
Accumulation of scientific evidence may undermine the reliance on
assertions of uncertainty. This effect will not eliminate objections from
those bearing the brunt of preventative measures, but it will allow
proponents of such measures to counter the opposition more effectively.
In the acid rain controversy, for example, Canada countered the U.S.
position by both attacking the U.S. assessment and offering its own
contrary scientific analysis.' 9° As a result, the United States has been
unable to ignore the evidence and has responded by pursuing more
aggressive abatement actions;' thus, the special interests opposed to
action were subdued.
Similarly, the initial stages of the negotiations for the Montreal
Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer witnessed indus-
tries, particularly those in Europe, contending that uncertainty under-
mined arguments for stringent measures to eliminate CFC emissions.'92
European governments heeded the advice of their industrial constituen-
cies and argued against aggressive action. 93 As evidence of CFCs'
adverse effects on the ozone mounted, industrial interests relented to
some extent, although their initial reaction to the Montreal Protocol was
that the treaty'9 reduction schedule went "too far, too fast, and far
beyond that which is necessary based on current scientific
188. See, e.g., Daniel B: Magraw, Overview of Acid Deposition, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND POLLUTION 247, 249-50 (Daniel B. Magraw ed., 1991).
189. Id. at 250 (noting that special interest groups from these states - and, no doubt,
national special interests - influenced the representatives).
190. See, e.g., Acid Critique, supra note 151.
191. Magraw, supra note, 188, at 250.
192. Benedick, supra note 9, at 33.
193. See, e.g., id. at 38 (explaining British opposition).
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understanding."' 94 The Protocol continued to evolve into more restrictive
measures as scientific consensus on ozone loss risk mounted. Industrial
concerns began accepting the inevitable measures to eliminate all ozone-
layer threatening substances.'
These examples indicate the importance of'efforts such as common
risk assessment to establish a collectively accepted factual basis for
national measures pursuant to the CCC. 9 6 By establishing this factual
basis, ongoing risk assessment will continue to provide the evidence
required to overcome opposition to more aggressive national actions.
Risk assessment should also play an important role in the enforce-
ment of the Convention itself. Article 12 of the CCC initially mandates
that each Party must periodically provide national inventories of "an-
thropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks" of greenhouse
gases, and a "general description of steps taken or envisaged by the
Party to implement the Convention."' 19 7 Additionally, developed country
Parties must submit "[a] detailed description of the policies and mea-
sures" adopted to "implement its commitments" and "[a] specific esti-
mate of the effects that" these policies and measures will achieve. 98 The
Conference of the Parties will periodically examine the Parties' obliga-
tions to assess "the overall effects of the measures taken pursuant to the
Convention . . . and the extent to which progress towards the objective
of the Convention is achieved."' 99
Currently, due to the lack of specific targets and timetables, any
determination of whether a country is in compliance with the CCC is
ambiguous.2"' Some common methodology for determining the effective-
ness of Parties' implementation measures is thus required. The Confer-
ence of the Parties is given the responsibility for promoting and guiding
the use of "comparable methodologies ... for evaluating the effective-
ness of measures to limit the emissions and enhance the removals of
194. id. at 103.
195. Id. at 134.
196. Establishing such common factual support has also been used by the Canada-United
States International Joint Commission in negotiations regarding international watercourses. See
Magraw, supra note 188, at 250 (citing R.B. BILDER, WHEN NEIGHBORS QUARREL: CANADA-
U.S. DiSPUTE-SETTLEMENT EXPERIENCE 54-60 (Inst. for Legal Studies, Univ. of Wis.-
Madison Law School ed., 1987).
197. CCC, supra note 1, art. 12, 1.
198. Id. art. 12, 2.
199. Id. art. 7, U 2(a) and 2(e).
200. Apart from the traditional need for technical verification of whether a nation's
emissions are reaching a level commensurate with the nation's proclaimed policies, the
Conference of Parties must also determine whether the nation's policies will satisfy the
objective of the Convention to "achieve ... stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations
... at a level that would prevent dangerous" climate change. Id. art. 2.
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these gases."20' The Conference of the Parties is to be assisted by the
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, which, in
addition to providing assessments regarding climate change and its
effects, shall provide "scientific assessments on the effect of measures
taken in the implementation of the Convention."'
The guidance necessary to evaluate performance should originate
from the priorities determined through the risk assessment process. Risk
assessment should be used to set more concrete standards that allow
comparison and evaluation of whether a state has met such standards.
Such a step would conform to international precedent. For example,
under the Montreal Protocol and the London amendments to the Montre-
al Protocol, an "Implementation Committee" may review compliance by
parties by determining whether a party has met the standards set by the
agreements. 203
Finally, as continued risk assessment decreases uncertainty, resulting
standards (timetables and targets) may be implemented as protocols to
the CCC. Article 17 provides that "[t]he Conference of the Parties...
may adopt protocols to the Convention." 204 The requirements for entry
into force of a protocol shall be incorporated into the protocol itself.2 5
Parties to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Lay-
er2° have effectively utilized the development of protocols to incorpo-
rate new scientific information into that Convention. For example, in
June, 1990, the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances That
Deplete the Ozone, which initially put the principles of the Vienna
Convention into effect, further tightened schedules for elimination of
CFCs on the basis of assessments made under article 6 of the Proto-
col.2' 7 A similar progression should occur with the CCC as consensus on
the risks of different emissions levels continues to develop.
4. Risk Assessment Approaches Applied to Climate Change
Application of risk assessment techniques will continue to provide
more reliable information regarding the risks of climate change resulting
201. Id. art. 7, 1 2(d).
202. Id. art. 9, 1 2(b).
203. See Handl, supra note 8, at 17; Note on Procedures and Institutional Mechanisms
for Determining Non-Compliance with the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer, U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzI.Pro.LG.I/2 (1989); Annex III, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/Ozl.Pro.2/3, 40.
204. CCC, supra note 1, art. 17, 1 1.
205. Id. art. 17, 3.
206. UNEP, Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Final Act
(Nairobi: UNEP, 1985).
207. London Revisions to the Montreal Protocol, June 1990, in Benedick, supra note 9,
at 242.
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from different ongoing greenhouse gas emissions levels.208 At least two
techniques should guide the risk assessors in identifying the emissions
targets .2 9 First, the assessors should continue to refine the "stability
approach" for analyzing climate change risks.210 The models utilized by
climate change assessors have assumed that climate changes gradually
over time. But, as the IPCC recognized, "the complexity of the system
may give rise to surprises."' t' Poorly understood feedback in the climate
system - such as more rapid degradation of organic matter resulting
from temperature rise and consequent increased methane emissions -
could lead to such surprises. A "stabilities approach" would track indica-
tors ("flags") to account for any potential instabilities.2t 2 Once a flag is
encountered, a non-linear, and hence non-gradual, effect may be antici-
pated. Seeking to reduce these potential feedback instabilities would
presumably lead to stricter targets than would an approach assuming
gradual climate change.2t 3
The "critical loads" approach, used in strategies to abate the effects
of acid rain, presents a second technique for ascertaining appropriate
emissions targets. This approach assumes that certain levels of pollutants
will, in the long term, adversely effect ecosystems. In acid rain assess-
ments, critical loads are the "critical deposition levels of acidifying
substances like [sulfuric acid] above which serious effects can be ex-
pected in the long term on natural ecosystems, causing large decreases
in ecological diversity. 2 l4 Determining critical load levels of atmospher-
ic greenhouse gases could assist policymakers in setting acceptable
emissions levels.
Once assessors use these approaches to determine the relative
acceptability of different emissions levels, policymakers can use the risk
management tool to determine the appropriate responses. They can
compare the cost of accepting an emission level's risk (or the cost of
adapting to the risk if adaptation is possible) with the cost of abatement.
Alternatively, the precautionary principle may suggest that the
policymakers take preventative actions without comparing the costs.
208. The discussion is limited to emissions although risk assessment will also continue to
indicate the effects from reductions in greenhouse gas removing sinks.
209. These considerations arise from the as yet evolving discipline of ecological risk
assessment and are therefore offered as preliminary ideas. See supra note 21.
210. Robert J. Swart & Monique J.M. Hootsmans, A Sound Footing For Controlling
Climate Change, 3 INT'L ENVTL. AFF. 124, 128 (1991).
211. IPCC SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 3.
212. Swart & Hootsmans, supra note 210, at 128. The authors identify two examples of
flags: "the concentrations of hydroxyl radicals, which can monitor the oxidizing capacity of
the atmosphere; and the monitoring of methane releases in permafrost regions or areas with
methane hydrates in sediments."
213. Id.
214. Id. at 130.
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IV. CONCLUSION
By signing the CCC, countries committed to'combating the risks
posed by global warming. This modem, multifaceted, environmental
hazard - characterized by its broad geographical scope, a plethora of
causes and effects, and its potentially irreversible nature - required a
systematic approach to secure a workable international response, an
approach the negotiators found in risk analysis methodologies.21
The tools of risk assessment and management were employed to
rank global warming risks and evaluate solutions. Due in part to uncer-
tainties in the risk analyses, however, the negotiators fashioned a Con-
vention of general commitments without specific targets for reductions
of greenhouse gases or timetables for reaching the general obligations.
Individual nations are left with the task of formulating national plans to
strive towards reducing greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by an
unspecified time.216
The CCC did, however, establish a framework capable of imple-
menting more concrete responses when scientific evidence demonstrates
stronger links between human activities, adverse changes to the earth's
climate, and damage to human and ecosystem health. The Convention
also institutes the mechanisms to obtain the necessary scientific evi-
dence. These mechanisms suggest that risk analysis play a vital role in
evaluating this evidence.21 7 The results of ongoing risk analysis will
assist nations in complying with the CCC, aid in the enforcement of the
Convention, and guide future negotiations to amend or add protocols to
the CCC.
218
Because of the diversity of causes and effects of climate change, the
continuing risk analysis process requires broad inclusion of interested
parties to fully inform the CCC policymakers. The risk assessment
process should consider the objective costs of the effects of climate
change and, because of different conceptions of justice and rationality,
countries' subjective perceptions of the magnitude that certain climate
change risks pose. 2'9 The inclusion of many interests in ranking the risks
will also lend legitimacy to policymakers' risk management decisions;
countries will more willingly bear their share of the costs necessary to
abate the risks of climate change if they played a role in conceiving the
215. See supra part 1.
216. See supra part III.A.
217. See supra notes 138-48 and accompanying text.
218. See supra part III.B.3.
219. See supra parts Il.A.2 and III.B.2.
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220appropriate response.
The Climate Change Convention turns the international community's
attention to one of the gravest risks to the planet's well-being. To facili-
tate the CCC's ability to address this hazard, risk analysis should contin-
ue to focus that attention on the worst risks and most promising re-
sponses.
220. See supra part III.B.1.
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